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The Return of the Two Nationalisms
June 22, 2008 in Tales from Taiwan by The China Beat | 6 comments

One fascinating aspect of the KMT’s regaining political dominance in Taiwan is the reappearance of two
forms of nationalism that have been central to that party’s political ideology, namely Greater China (大
中華) and anti-Japanese resistance (抗日). Both have enjoyed a certain degree of legitimacy in the
context of modern Chinese history, yet each carries its own risks as well.
The theme of Greater China found clear expression in President Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九’s inaugural
address, which emphasized the idea that the residents of both China and Taiwan were part of a
greater ”Chinese nation” (中華民族). It also seemed significant that Ma made no mention of Japan, as
well as the issue of whether Taiwan (or the Republic of China, for that matter) is a sovereign state.
From a diplomatic perspective, the skirting of such issues in order to enhance cross-Strait negotiations
makes considerable sense, as can be seen in the successful conclusion of agreements on direct flights
and tourism. However, as I noted in a previous blog, the question of who will benefit from these
policies is unclear, and there are also concerns about the costs. One example is Ma’s agreeing to be
addressed as ”Mr. Ma” when he meets China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
(ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin 陳雲林 later this year. While such compromises have a reasonable
chance of furthering future ties between China and Taiwan, one cannot help but think of other leaders
from the previous century who were willing to make all manner of sacrifices in the interest of ”peace
in our time”.
Anti-Japanese sentiments made a dramatic comeback in Taiwan’s political arena during a diplomatic
row with Japan that ensued after the June 10 sinking of a Taiwanese fishing vessel by a Japanese
patrol boat in disputed waters surrounding islets known in Taiwan as Tiaoyutai 釣魚台 and in Japan as
the Senkakus. Both Taipei and Tokyo claim these islets and their surrounding waters, in part due to
their abundant fishery resources and potential natural gas deposits. Japan subsequently apologized
and offered to negotiate compensation for the fishing boat’s captain, but the immediate aftermath of
the incident was marked by highly provocative comments, including Premier Liu Chao-shiuan 劉兆玄
allowing himself to be goaded by hard-line KMT legislators into saying that he did not ”exclude war”
with Japan.
Perhaps more importantly, in addition to recalling Koh Se-kai 許世楷, Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to
Japan, the Ma government scrapped the Committee on Japanese Affairs, a body that had played a key
role in improving Taiwan’s ties with Japan. Established in 2005, this committee comprised experts who
reported directly to the foreign minister and provided recommendations on Taiwan-Japan relations.
The presence of this committee contributed to steadily improving yet unofficial links with Tokyo, with
Japan overtaking the United States as Taiwan’s second-biggest trading partner after China in 2006,
and the two nations becoming each other’s top foreign tourist destinations.
Now that this committee has been axed, one wonders who will be responsible for managing ties with
Japan, and whether the links between these two countries will improve or continue to deteriorate. If
the Ma administration continues to play on emotional anti-Japanese sentiments, the people of Japan
might well conclude that years of friendship with Taiwan are now at risk. Such sentiments are already
being expressed in editorials in the Japanese media, which point to the rise of Greater China and antiJapanese sentiments as harbingers of what could be a ”nightmarish” future.
There have also been signs that these tensions are infecting Taiwan’s own domestic arena. On June
18, following a meeting with former president Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁, Koh Se-kai was struck by a
protester who claimed to be a member of the pro-unification Patriot Association (愛國同心會). This
assault followed highly charged comments by KMT lawmakers, who labeled Koh as a “Taiwan traitor” (
台奸) and “a Japanese, not a Taiwanese”. There have also been reports of Japanese students being
beaten up, and there is now enhanced security at the Taipei Japanese School.
It seems particularly fascinating that both of these forms of nationalism have also helped shape CCP
ideology, which suggests that they might serve as a common ground for future negotiations.

Moreover, both the CCP and the KMT have found it useful to exploit such sentiments in order to
distract attention from other issues. In Taiwan today, the stock market has plummeted 15% since
Ma’s inauguration, while prices are continuing to rise. In addition, the new government has been
plagued by controversies over its members having until recently enjoyed dual citizenship or
permanent residency, including the current Foreign Minister, who somehow managed to apply for a
green card while serving as ambassador to Guatemala. As a result, the administration’s popularity has
been steadily declining, and even a recent United Daily News (聯合報) poll showed Ma’s own rating at
50%, down from 66% one month ago.
Finally, there are disturbing indications of politics once again extending its claws into academia. One
example is the decision by National Cheng Chih University (國立政治大學) not to extend the contract (不
續聘) of former Ministry of Education Secretary Chuang Kuo-jung 莊國榮 on charges of “conduct
unbecoming of a professor” (行為不檢). While Chuang had made some highly offensive remarks about
Ma’s father, he had subsequently apologized, and the department and college faculty review
committees had only recommended a suspension, only to be overruled by the university review
committee in favor of the harsher punishment. During the past 10 years, there have been 106
instances of contract termination at Taiwan’s universities, but those that involved charges of “conduct
unbecoming of a professor” tended to be cases of sexual harassment, rape, and corruption, and
usually followed the accused faculty member’s being convicted in a court of law. There have also been
difficulties surrounding the proposed reappointment (回任) of former Representative to the United
States Joseph Wu 吳釗燮 at the same university. These events, combined with reports that many
officials appointed by the Chen administration are now in danger of losing their jobs, suggest a return
of the ”cicada in winter effect” (寒蟬效應), by which opposition voices gradually fall silent.
One hopes that the above instances are merely aberrations, and that the KMT’s return to power,
combined with the understandable quest for improved relations with China, do not come at the price
of rampant nationalism and the abandonment of the democratic freedoms that so many men and
women fought so hard to achieve.
Note: Some of the contents of this blogpost were inspired by Max Hirsch’s June 17 article entitled “Goodwill
between Japan, Taiwan fading after key committee scrapped”.

